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CONFLICT OF LAWS-AN ALTERNATIVE TO
LEX LOCI DELICTI IN WEST VIRGINIA
Until the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in
Babcock v. Jackson, I conflict of laws had become a settled, if not
stagnant, area of the common law. Perhaps because of the numer-
ous variables involved in resolving cases arguably related to more
than one state, a group of fixed rules had emerged to control choice
of law problems. Among these rules, probably none achieved more
universal adoption than that governing in tort actions. When the
fact situation involved more than one jurisdiction, and hence
seemed to require a choice of law, the traditional rule of lex loci
delicti automatically determined that the law of the place of the
wrong controlled the rights and liabilities of the parties.2 Although
the rule was occasionally criticized by legal scholars, 3 no court
expressly denounced it in favor of another approach to tort con-
flicts questions until the Babcock decision,4 where the court ap-
plied the substantive law of the state with the most significant
relationship to the controversy.' Since the time of that opinion,
however, a clear split of authority has emerged between those
states adhering to the lex loci delicti rule and those adopting the
Babcock approach.' Without acknowledging the development of
alternative means to decide choice-of-law questions, the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals invariably has followed the tradi-
tional rule.7 By comparing a recent West Virginia decision with the
Babcock case, this note will examine the general attributes and
shortcomings of both the lex loci rule and the most-significant-
'12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). Accord,
RESTATwNT (SECOND) OF CoNFucr OF LAws §§ 6, 145 (1971).
2 See, e.g., Owen v. Appalachian Power Co., 78 W. Va. 596,89 S.E. 262 (1916).
For the purposes of this note the difference between the place-of-the-wrong and the
place-of-the-injury rules is immaterial. The phrase "place of the tort" is used in
this discussion to apply to either situation.
I See generally Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L.
Ray. 173 (1933); Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and
Utility, 58 HARv. L. REv. 361 (1945); Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the
Conflict of Laws, 33 YAiE L.J. 457 (1924).
' But see Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954); Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
12 N.Y.2d at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283.
For a discussion of this split of authority, see Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 12 (1964
& Supp. 1976); 29 A.L.R.3d 603 (1970 & Supp. 1977).
7 See, e.g., Edwards v. Lynch, 175 S.E.2d 632 (W. Va. 1970); Tice v. E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., 144 W. Va. 24, 106 S.E.2d 107 (1958); White v. Hall,
118 W. Va. 85, 188 S.E. 768 (1936).
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relationship approach.8 While the older rule offers some advan-
tages over the most-significant-interest test, the kind of approach
adopted in Babcock should be appealing to the West Virginia
CourL for two primary reasons. First, it allows determination of the
choice-of-law question by the routine common-law process of ex-
amination of the respective interests of those states involved; sec-
ond, it avoids application of a fixed choice-of-law rule when no
actual conflict in state interests exists.
The application of foreign law by a forum court is no recent
development Despite its long history, however, the subject has
developed so slowly and independently from other elements of the
common law that one author claims, "It cannot be said that a
'body of conflicts law' has emerged from principles developed in
decided cases."" ° The commentator's point identifies a central
problem in choice-of-law rules. The traditional rules like lex loci
delicti crystallized rapidly but have been applied in robot-like
fashion whenever a fact pattern seems to involve several states.
When the appropriate situation appears, a fixed-rule method,
rather than the usual common-law method, is employed. This
mechanical characteristic of the rules of choice of law has inhibited
1 Although some United States Supreme Court decisions of the 1920's and
1930's indicated that the application of one state's law as opposed to another's
might conceivably violate the Constitution, the Court rapidly retreated from that
position. Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the Policy-
Centered Conflict of Laws, 56 Ky. L.J. 27, 53 (1967-68) [hereinafter cited as Sed-
ler]. The elusive concept of comity is now considered the basis on which a forum
recognizes the laws of another state. No state is constitutionally compelled to give
effect to another state's laws when the issue is merely one of choice of law; rather,
when courts do so they act out of respect, courtesy and good will. Some dicta in an
early West Virginia case explains:
While it is true that the citizens of the several States are one people and
one nation under the national government as the supreme authority
within the limitations of the Federal Constitution, still the States them-
selves are severally sovereign, independent and foreign to each other, in
regard to their internal ... affairs .... Such being the case, it results
therefrom that the State Constitutions and laws have no extraterritorial
force anywhere, except as conceded to them by mere comity.
Stevens v. Brown, 20 W. Va. 450, 459 (1882). Beyond the scope of this discussion is
the question of constitutional limitations on choice of law. For studies of this topic,
see, e.g., Currie, The Constitution and Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and
Judicial Function, 26 U. Con. L. Rav. 9 (1958); Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free
Choice of Law, 28 LAw CONTEMP. PRoB. 706 (1963).
1 For a capsulized treatment of the historical development of conflict of laws
from thirteenth-century Italy to twentieth-century America, see Sedler, supra note
8, at 27-81.
,o Id. at 82.
[Vol. 80
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the development of a viable body of conflicts law. As Justice Tray-
nor astutely observed in an article published four years before
Babcock v. Jackson, "The law of conflicts has been kept in its
infancy all too long to survive another deep freeze."'"
The usual common-law method looms in contrast to the me-
chanical, rigid rules controlling conventional conflicts decisions.
An interesting description of the means by which legal rules evolve
at common law reveals, "Common-law judges regularly solve one
problem at a time and count themselves lucky if they get the easy
one first . . . .After a score of years or a century, the rule as
ultimately stated may resemble but slightly its first formula-
tion.' 2 The common-law method is inherently inductive, moving
from the particular facts of one case and its resolution to the differ-
ent facts of the next case. This process is more than the means by
which the law grows-it is the life-blood and essence of the law.
Holmes' observation of the nature of the common law contrasts
with the fixed-rule method so long engrained in conflict of laws.
Inimitably, he writes, "The law embodies the story of a nation's
development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with
as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of
mathematics."'"
A definition of conflict of laws and a general statement of its
function must be formulated before a more detailed consideration
of the strengths and weaknesses of lex loci delicti and most-
significant-relationship rules can be undertaken. The search for a
satisfactory definition produces the realization that essentially two
kinds of definitions exist. Not surprisingly, proponents of the lex
loci rule advocate one meaning of the term, while supporters of the
most-significant-relationship rule propose another. The former
group defines a conflict-of-laws issue in relatively general terms as
the choice-of-law question which arises whenever the forum state
differs from the place of the tort or whenever the fact pattern
giving rise to the cause of action crosses state boundaries. One
definition suggests, "A conflict of laws situation is presented when-
ever a legal situation arises in which there is foreign element.""
I Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. Rav. 657, 675 (1959).
,2 Leflar, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict
of Laws, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1212, 1248 (1963).
"0. HoLMEs, ThE COMMON LAw 1 (1881).
" Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. VA. L. REv. 156, 156
(1929-30).
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Markedly different is that definition offered by the sponsors
of the newer rule:
A question of conflict of laws may be said to arise whenever a
case contains some foreign element, that is, whenever some or
all of the legally significant facts occurred in a jurisdiction other
than that in which the suit is brought and/or all the parties are
non-residents of the forum state. 5
The difference in the two definitions pervades the controversy be-
tween the two groups. The problem with the general definition
given first is that in order to have a conflict of laws resulting in the
forum's making a choice, there must initially be "competition"
between the laws of the states involved. Of course, the mere fact
that one state's position on a particular legal issue differs from
another's on that question does not create a conflict of laws. An
actual conflict requiring choice of law arises only when: 1) a differ-
ence exists between the two states' positions, and 2) those facts
occur which directly juxtapose the legitimate reasons for each
state's rule to be applied to the facts.
This limitation on the definition of conflict of laws to those
occurrences which involve "competing" state interests not only
appeals to common sense by its refusal to apply conflicts rules
needlessly, but also promotes the ultimate objective of the subject.
Professor Cheatham explains the function of conflicts:
Conflict of laws has as its task the coordination of the laws of
our interstate and international systems as they bear on an
occurrence. To do this wisely, it must have a flexibility of
method that will enable it to cope with the infinite variety of
human transactions that cut across state and national fron-
tiers."
Only in light of this definition of conflict of laws and of the ulti-
mate function of this legal field can one effectively contrast the
traditional lex loci delicti method with the Babcock approach.
The first statement of West Virginia's adoption of the lex loci
delicti rule appears in Owen v. Appalachian Power Company."7
Although the action was brought in the Circuit Court of Mercer
County, West Virginia, the plaintiff, a Virginia resident, was in-
s Sedler, supra note 8, at 28 (emphasis added).
, Cheatham, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in
Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1230 (1963).
17 78 W. Va. 596, 606, 89 S.E. 262, 267 (1916).
[Vol. 80
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jured in Virginia by high voltage from one of defendant's power
lines extending across a farm in Virginia. Defendant corporation
was chartered under the laws of that state and had its principal
place of business in Richmond."8
The court applied Virginia law to determine the plaintiff's
rights: "Plaintiff's injury occurred in the state of Virginia, and his
right to recover depends upon the law of that state."'9 Although the
court did not question the validity of or examine the reason for this
conflicts rule, it cited for support Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Brown,"0 where the United States Supreme Court adopted the rule.
Despite the persuasive nature of the highest court's decision, West
Virginia was not bound to follow the conflicts rule stated in
Western Union. The United States Supreme Court did not ground
its decision in that case on any constitutional provision; nor did it
mention an alternative rule. Of course at the time of the Western
Union decision in 1914, no court in the country seemed to adhere
to any rule significantly different from the predecessor of the lex
loci theory. The opinion of the Supreme Court on this point is
couched in terms analogous to the vested-rights doctrine, the fore-
runner of the place-of-the-injury rule. In his opinion Justice
Holmes wrote:
[I]t is established as the law of this court that when a person
recovers in one jurisdiction for a tort committed in another, he
does so on the ground of an obligation incurred at the place of
the tort that accompanies the person of the defendant else-
where, and that is not only the ground but the measure of the
maximum recovery.2'
Although perhaps in theory this concept of an obligation differs
slightly from the strict vested-rights theory, the two are practically
indistinguishable and achieve the same end-in both, the law of
the place of the tort controls. A brief explanation of the vested-
rights theory is that the right to recover for a foreign tort "owes
its creation to the law of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred
and depends for its existence and extent solely on such law."
The effect of the West Virginia court's adoption of the place-
Id.
,Id. at 606.
2Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914).
21 Id. at 547.
" Chappell, Lex Loci Delicti and Babcock v. Jackson, 7 WM. & MARY L. Rsv.
249, 249 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Chappell].
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of-the-tort rule in Owen is neither disturbing nor inequitable. Two
of the more attractive features of the place-of-the-tort rule are
mentioned below: "[E]ven though the place of accident may be
fortuitous, the application of its law may be justified on the ground
that it is readily ascertainable and leads to uniform results." '
Perhaps conflicts rules in torts would have progressed more rapidly
in West Virginia had the application of the rule in this early case
effected a different result. Several facts, however, make the use of
Virginia law sensible. First, the West Virginia forum had no con-
tact with the controversy other than hearing the case; conse-
quently, it had no significant interest in the controversy. Under
this place-of-the-tort choice-of-law rule, the West Virginia court is
bound by the Virginia court's decisions on matters of substantive
law. Furthermore, the case involved a negligence question and, as
the West Virginia court noted, "[W]e are not aware of any dis-
tinction between the laws of the two states on that subject."',
In a case comparable to Owen, the vested-rights or place-of-
the-tort theories operate satisfactorily. Moreover, the use of the
rule's test is quite simple: in what state was the plaintiff injured?
Because the rule works so well with this particular kind of fact
pattern, the court failed to distinguish subsequent significantly
different cases from Owen. In the more than sixty years since this
decision, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has opined
no challenge to the lex loci delicti approach to conflicts problems,
although frequently the application of the old rule obtains inequit-
able and harsh results.
In contrast to the Owen case in which the place-of-the-tort
rule by chance referred the court to the law of the only state with
a significant interest in the controversy, hovers a series of decisions
in which the sole contact with the state whose law controls is the
occurrence of the tort within that jurisdiction.25 A quite recent
decision by the West Virginia court exemplifies this category of
cases. Hopkins v. Grubb2 involved a suit.by a guest passenger and
her husband against her hostess driver to recover for injuries sus-
tained in a one-car accident. Defendant Grubb and plaintiff Hop-
2 Baer, Two Approaches to Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws: Mechanical
Jurisprudence Versus Groping for Contacts, 16 BuFFALo L. Rav. 537, 538 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Baer].
"' 78 W. Va. at 606, 89 S.E. at 267.
See, e.g., Dodrill v. Young, 143 W. Va. 429, 102 S.E.2d 724 (1958); Wood v.
Shrewsbury, 117 W. Va. 569, 186 S.E. 294 (1936).
2 Hopkins v. Grubb, 230 S.E.2d 470 (W. Va. 1977).
[Vol. 80
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kins, both residents of West Virginia, left their homes in McDowell
County early one morning to drive to Johnson City, Tennessee,
where the defendant was to have her eyes examined. Driving in the
rain on a four-lane highway in Tazwell County, Virginia, the defen-
dant decided to pass a truck, glanced in her rear-view mirror and
started around the other vehicle. As she swerved into the left lane,
she heard a horn sound, cut back to the right, and lost control of
her car which turned a circle, crossed all four lanes and settled in
a ditch. Plaintiff Hopkins suffered serious, permanent injuries in
the accident." At the time of the wreck, Virginia had in force a
guest statute requiring a guest to prove gross negligence in order
to recover from a host for injuries resulting from the host's negli-
gence.2
Citing several precedents for the application of the lex loci
rule,2" the court reiterated the rule without examining its effect,
the interests of the states involved, or trends in other jurisdictions.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Caplan stated, "This unfor-
tunate incident, having occurred in the state of Virginia, the sub-
stantive law of that state will be applied."3 Thus, the court held
that the trial court properly required plaintiff to prove gross negli-
gence to recover against her hostess. Because the jury found the
defendant guilty of gross negligence, and, consequently, returned
the verdict for the plaintiff, the application of the Virginia guest
statute in this case did not effect a different result than would have
been reached under West Virginia substantive law, which requires
only a showing of ordinary negligence."
An examination of Justice Neely's dissent, however, reveals
the majority opinion's avoidance of the harsh effect of West Vir-
ginia's lex loci choice-of-law rule. As Justice Neely noted, "The
evidence in this case is clearly insufficient to present a jury ques-
tion on the issue of defendant's gross negligence, if the cited Vir-
ginia standard is to be honestly observed.""2 By claiming that rea-
sonable persons could differ on the issue and, thus, allowing the
jury to determine the question of gross negligence, the trial and
appellate courts shunned the responsibility of allowing the defen-
dant to receive a directed verdict, avoided the result of the lex loci





12 Id. at 474.
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delicti rule, and, yet, maintained the facade of consistency and
uniformity by appearing to apply Virginia law. The West Virginia
court claimed to be using the Virginia substantive law. In fact, the
Virginia definition of gross negligence required " . .. utter disre-
gard of prudence amounting to a complete neglect of safety of the
guest. It must be such a degree of negligence as would shock fair-
minded men... ."I Comparing this definition to the facts of the
Hopkins case, gross negligence is hard to find. The majority as-
serted that several elements combined to create the gross negli-
gence: "All of these factors presented a proper question for jury
consideration."'" Quite simply, however, the defendant's conduct
neither exhibited utter disregard of prudence nor shocked the fair-
minded observer. Notably, even the majority opinion contains no
expression that the defendant's conduct did either of these. As the
dissent correctly observed, although the court claimed to conform
to Virginia substantive law, it surreptitiously avoided doing so to
prevent a harsh result.3
The majority opinion in Hopkins v. Grubb demonstrates some
of the difficulties with the use of the traditional choice-of-law rule
in tort actions. Another weakness emerges when one examines the
purpose of the Virginia guest statute to decide if that objective
would be promoted by the application of the Virginia statute in a
case like Hopkins. Unquestionably, guest statutes were passed in
response to persistent lobbying by insurance companies to protect
themselves from collusive suits between a driver and his guest."
While such an aim may be legitimate, it was not furthered by
application of the statute in the instant case. The Virginia General
Assembly passed its statute to protect Virginia insurers; in con-
trast, West Virginia had no such statute at the time either of the
wreck or of the suit. Where, as here, a West Virginia defendant and
plaintiff leave their state and become involved in an accident in
Virginia, it is doubtful that a Virginia insurer could be harmed by
the plaintiff's recovery against the hostess. If the purpose of the
Virginia statute is not promoted, there is no reason to apply it."7
3 Ferguson v. Ferguson, 212 Va. 86, 91, 181 S.E.2d 648, 653 (1971).
" 230 S.E. 2d at 473.
" Id. at 473-74.
M Sedler, supra note 8, at 108.
. Another justification for application of lex loci delicti in conflicts cases with
guest statutes depends on the theory that people act in accordance with the law of
the jurisdiction where they are present. This reasoning is inappropriate in automo-
bile tort cases because, as Ehrenzweiz argues, the driver of a car is not more careful
because his insurer will be liable for injuries to his guests caused by his negligence;
[Vol. 80
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Praised by one commentator as "the most important conflicts
case of the century,"" Babcock v. Jackson39 offers an attractive
alternative to the traditional choice-of-law rule in tort cases involv-
ing more than one jurisdiction. Factually similar to Hopkins v.
Grubb,"0 Babcock concerned New York residents who traveled to
Ontario and were involved in an accident there. Ontario's guest
statute completely barred an action by an injured guest against a
host driver, but under New York law the suit would not have been
barred. The New York trial court granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss on the ground that the law of the place of the tort
governed, and, hence, the Ontario statute prevented plaintiff from
recovering. Over a vehement dissent, the intermediate appellate
division affirmed the dismissal."
After a brief recitation of the facts, however, Judge Fuld gave
notice in his statement of the issue that the New York Court of
Appeals would reverse. He wrote:
The question presented is simply drawn. Shall the place of
the tort invariably govern the availability of relief for tort or
shall the applicable choice of law rule also reflect a considera-
tion of other factors which are relevant to the purposes served
by the enforcement or denial of the remedy? 2
This framing of the issue reveals the court's cognizance of an alter-
native theory to the lex loci rule. The court recited the old rule,
noted criticism of it, observed a "judicial trend towards its aban-
donment or modification,"' 3 and finally began its discussion of a
new rule. The court cited Auten v. Auten," where a "grouping of
contacts" theory had been applied to a conflicts decision involv-
ing a contract dispute, and Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 5
therefore, "it would clearly be improper to justify subjection of this liability to the
law of the place of the wrong on the ground that it is admonitory in character."
Ehrenzweiz, Guest statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE L.J. 595, 599 (1960).
u Note, The Impact of Babcock v. Jackson on Conflict of Laws, 52 VA. L. Ray.
302, 302 (1966).
31 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
," 230 S.E.2d 470 (W. Va. 1977).
" Babcock v. Jackson, 17 App. Div.2d 694 (1962), rev'd, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191
N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
2 12 N.Y.2d at 477, 191 N.E.2d at 280-81, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
13 Id. at 479-480, 191 N.E.2d at 281-82, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 747-48.
" 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954) (cited with approval in Babcock v.
Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963)).
,3 9 N.E.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (cited with approval
in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963)).
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where the court refused to follow the place-of-the-tort rule in a suit
involving a plane wreck when the plaintiffs trip originated in New
York, but the accident occurred elsewhere. Two common elements
about these and other similar decisions were observed: 1) the rejec-
tion of the inflexible place-of-the-tort rule where that state is es-
sentially disinterested; 2) the adoption of the law of the state with
the more compelling interest in the issue under consideration."6
Finally, Judge Fuld compared New York's and Ontario's in-
terests:
The present action involves injuries sustained by a New York
guest as a result of the negligence of a New York host in the
operation of an automobile, garaged, licensed, and undoubtedly
insured in New York, in the course of a week-end journey which
began and was to end there. In sharp contrast, Ontario's sole
relationship with the occurrence is the purely adventitious cir-
cumstance that the accident occurred there.
47
The court then examined the purpose of Ontario's guest statute,
found it to be the prevention of fraudulent claims against insurers,
and concluded that the Ontario legislators could not have been
concerned with protecting New York insurers.'8
An important distinction appears later in the opinion. The
majority made certain that the case was not to be confused with
one wherein the statute related to the manner in which the defen-
dant had been driving his car. Appropriately, the court recognized
that the place of the tort has a proper interest in controlling the
conduct of persons within its boundaries. The opinion closes on
this important distinction:
Where the issue involves standards of conduct, it is more than
likely that it is the law of the place of the tort which will be
controlling but the disposition of other issues must turn, as does
the issue of the standard of conduct itself, on the law of the
jurisdiction which has the strongest interest in the resolution of
the particular issue presented."
Id. at 479, 191 N.E.2d at 282, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
" Id. at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
0 Id. at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 286, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750. But see Baer, supra note
23, at 553-54. The Babcock court also notes, "[G]iven the facts of the present case,
the result would be the same and the law of New York applied where the foreign
guest statute requires a showing of gross negligence." 12 N.Y.2d at 484 n.14, 191
N.E.2d at 285 n.14, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 752 n.14.
,1 12 N.Y.2d at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
[Vol. 80
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This departure from traditional choice-of-law rules seems at first
glance to be a radical change. Upon closer scrutiny, however, the
final qualification in Fuld's opinion makes clear that the effect of
Babcock is not wholesale substitution of the most-significant-
relationship theory for the lex loci delicti rule, but rather the demo-
tion.of the place of the tort from its position as the sole factor in
deciding which law governs to one of several factors to be consid-
ered. Where the place of the tort is a significant element, as in
Owen, proper weight should be attached to it. On the other hand,
where the place of the tort is merely fortuitous, as in Babcock and
Hopkins, that factor should give way to more significant ones.
Not surprisingly, the Babcock decision has suffered its share
of criticism. Terming it "wholly indefensible," one author claimed
that the decision "destroys uniformity."5 Another argued that it
diminishes the certainty necessary for settlement and trial pro-
cesses.51 While these objections are not entirely meritless, the
courts' use of escape devices, as exemplified by West Virginia's
questionable handling of the Virginia law in Hopkins,52 had al-
ready eroded any real certainty and predictability the old rule once
afforded.
In The Nature of the Judicial Process" Justice Cardozo recog-
nized the importance of uniformity in the law, but he also demon-
strated a keen awareness of the atrophying effect of blind adher-
ence to outdated rules:
One of the most fundamental social interests is that the law
shall be uniform and impartial .... But symmetrical devel-
opment may be bought at too high a price .... The social
interest served by symmetry or certainty must then be balanced
against the social interest served by equity and fairness or other
elements of social welfare."
An understanding of the paramount importance of the develop-
ment of a rational and progressive body of conflicts rules echoes
in the following words: "Courts striving to emulate Babcock in this
f Sparks, Babcock v. Jackson-A Practicing Attorney's Reflections Upon the
Opinion and Its Implications, 31 INS. CouNsEL J. 428, 428, 435 (1964).
"1 Kinney, The Interstate Aviation Accident-What Law Governs, 31 INs.
COUNSEL J. 250, 260 (1964).
11 For another example of a court's avoidance of the harsh result of traditional
conflicts rules, see Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143
A. 163 (1928).
"B. CADozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDctUL PROCESS (1921).
54 Id. at 112-13.
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spirit may not achieve uniformity but they are likely to attain a
much closer approximation to justice than those.., past decisions
that have rubber-stamped the place-of-injury rule.""5
A final criticism of the opinion in Babcock arises from the
court's use of a variety of terms to describe its choice-of-law
method. Because of the adoption of such different words as
"interests," "contacts," and "significant relationships," "several
learned authors found support [in the opinion] for their pet theo-
ries."" Although this criticism of the loose language makes a valid
point for the scholar attempting to distinguish various theories, the
following comment undermines the critique with a practical obser-
vation. It explains, "[T]here is no reason for [a court] to accept
a particular policy-centered theory .... What is necessary is that
the court employ the traditional method of judicial decision in a
conflicts case as it has done in all areas of the law.",7
Among the finest attributes of a policy-centered approach ex-
emplified by Babcock is its effectiveness in identifying and dealing
with "false conflicts.""8 Simply defined as instances where only one
state has any real interest in the application of its law,"0 this con-
cept is a useful tool when fact situations include several jurisdic-
tions. Unlike the traditional rule which mechanically applies lex
loci whenever the facts involve more than one state, this offspring
of the policy-oriented approach examines the various state inter-
ests before making a choice of law. By doing so, it obviates the
necessity of making a selection where only one state is interested
and no real conflict exists. Recollection of the facts of the Hopkins
case, for example, brings to mind that both plaintiff and defendant
were West Virginians; they left West Virginia to travel to Tennes-
see; the lawsuit arose in West Virginia; and only by incidence of
fate did the accident occur in Virginia. In such a case as this,
Virginia has no real interest in the application of its substantive
law. Its guest statute was passed to protect Virginia insurers
against collusive lawsuits. West Virginia, on the other hand, is the
concerned state. Application of a Babcock approach to conflicts
choices in tort cases reveals the Hopkins case to be one involving
no actual conflict between states' laws.
" Cavers, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Con-
flict of Laws, 63 COLuM. L. Rav. 1212, 1229 (1963).
" Baer, supra note 23, at 551.
61 Sedler, supra note 8, at 86.
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CONFLICT OF LAWS
The traditional choice-of-law rule presently in force in West
Virginia offers some appeal. Lex loci delicti is easy to apply; it
seems to offer certainty, predictability and uniformity. No doubt
some lawyers and courts will find these factors sufficiently impor-
tant to justify adherence to this mechanical means of determining
what law to apply in conflicts decisions. As one author observed,
"[A] careful review of post-Babcock decisions reveals that prag-
matically Babcock has not sounded the death knell of lex loci
delicti .... ."" In an obscure section of Babcock v. Jackson, how-
ever, Judge Fuld explained why New York had not changed its
position on this issue earlier than 1963. His comment reflects the
present position of the West Virginia court: "[Tihe question here
posed was neither raised nor considered in those [earlier] cases
"01
A court able to escape the bounds of lex loci delicti affords
itself a variety of attractive advantages. More importantly, such a
court finally becomes free to develop a rational body of conflicts
law which follows the traditional common law method of examin-
ing the interests of the states involved, resolving issues on a case
by case basis, and recognizing (and appropriately dealing with)
false conflicts.
F. Samuel Byrer
Chappell, supra note 22, at 257.
" 12 N.Y.2d at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
13
Byrer: Conflict of Laws--An Alternative to Lex Loci Delicti in West Virg
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1978
